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Hastings Center Report* September-Qciober 1995
by Henk A.M.J. ten Have
The current model of technology assessment treats ethics
itself as just another problem-solving technology. Ethics 
should resist this model to play a more critical role in tech­
nology assessment by better understanding the complex re­
lationship between society, medicine, and technology—and 
by recasting how problems are defined.
N ot long ago, the New York Tunes reported that the Na­tional Association of the
_______  Deaf in the U.S. protested
against cochlear implants in chil­
dren.1 This is a new technology, trans­
lating sounds into signals through a 
minicomputer that transmits electric 
impulses to an electrode in the acous­
tic nerve within the cochlea. The pro­
mise is that with the aid of implants 
deaf children can learn to communi­
cate by interpreting the auditory sig­
nals transmitted. What could be more 
valuable than restoring hearing ca­
pacities in erstwhile deaf children?
The major objection of the Na­
tional Association of the Deaf is that 
this new technology threatens the 
slowly obtained recognition and con­
tinued existence of the specific cul-
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ture of the deaf, namely, the sign lan­
guage and communication systems 
developed within the world of the 
deaf. The availability of implants will 
be a setback in the gradual process of 
destigmatization and appreciation of 
the idiosyncratic value system of deaf 
people. What the Association fears is 
that the new technology will lead to 
pressure, however subtle and implicit 
it may be, upon the deaf to accommo­
date to the world of hearing people. 
After a long struggle it has gradually 
been accepted that the deaf are physi­
cally inconvenienced but no t handi­
capped or disabled; now, the use of 
implants may reintroduce the idea 
that deafness is a defect that is repara­
ble with technology. L earn ing  to 
communicate with implants is more 
difficult than learning sign language, 
and the result is always imperfect. 
Therefore, instead of creating their 
own world and being accepted as nor­
mal in a shared culture, die deaf now 
will be pressured into adapting to the 
world of the hearing—an adaptation 
that will necessarily be partial and in­
complete, and that will continuously 
reinforce the marginality o f those 
who cannot m eet the standards o f the 
hearing world without technical aids.
Although several assessment stud­
ies of implant technology are under 
way, this kind of critical perspective is 
not brought to bear; it does not fit 
well into the usual format of technol­
ogy assessment programs. Usually it is 
argued that the host of social, legal, 
and ethical questions raised by the 
application of new technology, par­
ticularly in health care, can be system­
atically examined with a metatech­
nology, consistent use of which will 
clarify such nontechnical issues and 
make them amenable to policy and 
management.
For example, the Dutch govern­
m ent's Committee on Choices in 
Health Care argued that not every­
thing in medicine that is technically 
possible ought necessarily to be intro­
duced into the health care system." 
New technologies should be evalu­
ated before they are applied. That 
implies systematic research (identify­
ing, selecting, testing, and evaluating 
specific technologies), which includes 
consideration of the ethical, legal, 
and social implications of a new tech­
nology as well as rational decision- 
making based on the results.
The call for evaluation has indeed 
led to a growing num ber of technol­
ogy assessment (TA) studies and pro­
grams.3 Yet despite concern for the 
ethical implications of technological 
development, it is rare to see TA pro­
grams in which systematic analysis of 
such implications is an integral and 
substantial component. Though in­
tended to be attentive to a variety of 
dim ensions o f new technologies 
(namely, medical, economical, social, 
psychological, ethical, legal), in prac­
tice research focuses almost exclu­
sively on its biomedical implications. 
Here we have a curious paradox. 
Wishing to control the processes by 
which medical technology is devel­
oped, introduced, and used, and be­
ing concerned about the moral im­
plications of new technologies, gov­
ernments, agencies, and individual 
scholars have developed programs of 
technology assessment; however, 
such programs mainly focus on effec­
tiveness and safety, and hardly ad­
dress in a systematic way the moral 
concerns that were part of their gene­
sis. The aim of this article is to eluci­
date this paradox. That ethical analy­
sis is rarely incorporated in technol-
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ogy assessment studies has to do with 
the particular conceptualization of 
technology assessment and the de­
marcation of technology prevailing 
in current evaluation practices. How­
ever, it also has to do with the ten­
dency to consider ethics as a specific 
technology itself, which can be ap­
plied to resolve the moral conse­
quences of the use of medical tech­
nologies. A repositioning of ethics 
will be necessary to uncover and ana­
lyze the moral dimension of practices 
of developing, testing, and using 
technologies in the context of health 
care.
The Concept of 
Technology Assessment
Some argue that the popularity of 
technology assessment should be re­
garded as a response to the wave of 
criticism toward science and technol­
ogy in the 1960s and 1970s.4 Initially, 
the term technology assessment was em­
ployed in the areas of environmental 
problems and developments in the 
physical sciences; later, the emphasis 
was increasingly on medical technol­
ogy. One of the most important ob­
jectives of TA is to anticipate and, 
where possible, prevent negative and 
harmful effects of technological de­
velopment and to facilitate positive 
effects. Joseph Coates, for example, 
defines the concept o f technology as­
sessment as “the systematic study of 
the effects on society that may occur 
when a technology is introduced, ex­
tended, or modified, with special em­
phasis on the impacts that are unin­
tended, indirect, and delayed.”5 
In this definition, the relationship 
between technology and society is re­
garded as unilateral. Emphasis is on 
the effects upon communal life and 
the social repercussions that may ac­
company the introduction of a new 
technology; the various influences of 
social conditions upon technological 
change itself are disregarded. The 
definition also conceptualizes the so­
cial effects in a specific way: research 
should primarily be directed toward 
the unintended and indirect effects 
of technological change that are less 
significant and only become manifest 
in the long run. The moral dimen­
sions of new technologies therefore 
are considered secondary or “sec­
ond-order consequences.” Similar 
tendencies may be observed in the 
Office of Technology Assessment’s 
definition:
Medical technology assessment 
is, in a narrow sense, the evalu­
ation or testing of a medical tech­
nology for safety and efficacy. In 
a broader sense, it is a process 
of policy research that examines 
the short- and long-term conse­
quences of individual medical 
technologies/'
Here, also, a distinction is drawn be­
tween a central and a peripheral as­
sessment process. The core of evalu­
ation studies has to do with the ques­
tion of whether the technology can 
be applied safely and effectively. Spe­
cial problems arise when the technol­
ogy is applied within a social context, 
requiring a more encompassing eval­
uation design. The definition at least 
suggests that such a  broader study has 
a secondary status: it is only feasible 
when the core processes have been 
studied. Studies that are restricted to 
these core processes, however, may 
also be called technology assessment 
studies.
The OTA definition refers, further­
more, to another important aspect of 
technology assessment studies: they 
intend to produce data to facilitate 
m ore in form ed policy decisions.7 
Thus as Coates has noted, technology 
assessment is a class of policy studies,8 
a rational contribution to present-day 
health care policy confronted with 
the need to control rising costs and 
regulate the use of medical technolo­
gies. For some authors, however, the 
relationship between technology as­
sessment and health care policy is not 
that stringent. They prefer a two- 
phase approach to assessing medical 
technology. The first phase of assess­
m ent is “systematic information gen­
eration to support societal decisions 
on  medical technologies.”9 Only 
when reliable (and preferably quan­
titative) data are available is the sec­
ond level relevant: developing health 
care policy and making practical de­
cisions concerning the use of tech­
nologies. Ethical issues will only 
arise at this second level when the 
data of technology assessment stud­
ies must be im plem ented in medical 
practice.
Presuppositions about Technology
Such definitions of technology as­
sessment sequester ethical questions 
as second-order concerns tha t are 
significant only at the  level o f policy­
making. Such delineation originates 
from a restricted view of technology 
that presupposes a set of specific rela­
tions between technology and society, 
knowledge and its application, infor­
mation and decisionmaking, and the 
medical and  nonm edical domains 
that are problematic philosophically.
The current concept o f technology 
assessment radically divorces technol­
ogy from social context and assumes 
that we are initially confronted with a 
new technology and  only secondarily 
with the effects o f this technology on 
society. It is argued, for example, that 
changes in health  care under the in­
fluence of technology have led to in­
creasing concern about '‘societal side 
effects.”10 This terminology is signifi­
cant: a new technology is introduced, 
applied in health care practice, and 
then produces “side effects,” Tech- 
nology and society are considered in­
dependent entities; problem s arise 
because the first entity has a particu­
lar impact upon  the second.
The philosophical literature and 
data from science studies indicate 
that the relationship of technology 
and society is m uch m ore intricate.11 
Technology is n o t only a cultural 
product, but itself a  producer of cul­
ture. The constr uction of a new tech­
nology always requires a  specific set­
ting, the concom itant construction of 
a world in which the technology can 
be applied appropriately. In other 
words, instead of assuming that tech­
nology has social effects, it is better to 
say that a technology constitutes a 
particular practice which is medical 
and social at the same time. For ex­
ample, new technologies in medical 
testing (such as chemical analysis of 
urine) will only “work” when a par­
ticular examination practice has been 
established with rules and  prescrip­
tions that de term ine  how doctors 
must proceed and  how patients must 
be treated.12 It is n o t the case that, 
once obtained, new knowledge is sim­
ply available for introduction into ex­
isting practices. Rather, development 
and application o f knowledge go to­
gether with redefin ition  o f those
practices in any of several ways: by 
changing the objectives of interven­
tion (not treatment but testing), trans­
forming normative status (chemical 
analysis detects an underlying disor­
der in a patient who superficially 
seems healthy), or modifying social 
interactions (newly demarcating du­
ties among physicians or between 
medical advisor, examining doctor, 
and insurance agent, as well as be­
tween doctor and patient).
The definitions of technology as­
sessment assume that knowledge 
comes first and application follows, 
and that it is therefore possible to 
identify innovations and to evaluate 
them prior to their general use. This 
presupposition is reflected in the 
well-known idea of the life cycle of a 
technology, as well as in the notion 
that there is a critical moment for
♦  •  4  ♦  1 ^initiating an assessment study. ' It is 
taken as common knowledge that the 
process of innovation, research and 
development, and diffusion of new 
technologies has a fixed pattern. A 
familiar graph, representing the scale 
of use of a technology over time, 
shows a typical phase model: first, the 
discovery of new knowledge (the 
phase of fundamental research); sec­
ond, the incorporation of this knowl­
edge into a new technology (the 
phase of applied research prototype 
development); third, the evaluation 
of safety and effectiveness (the phase 
of clinical trials); fourth, the develop­
ment of programs to demonstrate the 
applicability for worldwide imple­
mentation (the phase of demonstra­
tion programs); fifth, diffusion and 
general acceptance (the phase of 
adoption by professionals); sixth, 
training in use and application in sev­
eral categories of patients. The model 
finally assumes that the scale of use 
stabilizes and levels off over time, as 
the particular technology becomes 
obsolete, discredited, or replaced 
through new, m ore promising tech­
nologies. Such a life-cycle model im­
plies that technology assessment stud­
ies must be executed at the right mo­
ment* Evaluation is most important 
when the diffusion process of the 
technology is beginning to unfold. 
Early in the developmental life of the 
technology, evaluation data are usu­
ally scarce and incomplete; evalu­
ation of a technology when it is al­
ready disseminating in medical prac­
tice, however, is too late to be of any 
support for policymaking.
Recent studies have criticized this 
linear model, showing the complex 
simultaneity of knowledge and  appli­
cation. In his analysis of the 1952 po­
liomyelitis epidemic in Copenhagen,
Ger Wackers showed how in clinical 
practice, changes occur simultane­
ously in scientific knowledge, medical 
technology, moral evaluation, and so­
cial context.14 In the Copenhagen 
hospital for infectious diseases, con­
sultation of a free-lance anesthesiolo­
gist led to the reduction of the high . 
mortality rate of bulbar polio: this 
outsider interpreted the patients’ le­
thal condition not as a metabolic al­
kalosis, but as a respiratory acidosis, 
transforming the condition into a 
ventilation problem, manageable by 
manual positive pressure ventilation.
The effectiveness of the interven­
tion was so obvious that medical stu­
dents were mobilized in shifts to ven­
tilate manually (up to 700 patients at 
the same time, twenty-four hours per 
day). This case illustrates how an ex­
isting technology (manual positive 
pressure ventilation was known for 
centuries) is applied as soon as a 
problem is identified for which it is a 
solution. Knowledge is application. 
Application, however, also requires 
the creation of a social network for 
the appropriate use of the technol­
ogy, such as the establishment of an­
esthesiology as a medical discipline or 
the discovery of useful actors who can 
easily learn to apply the technology. 
At the same time, efforts are under­
taken to control this network bet­
ter—in this case, by making “me­
chanical students,” namely, building 
respirators. Wacker’s study finally 
shows how a technology will “find” 
another practical setting as soon as 
the initial problem has become less
urgent. By the time the polio epi­
demic was extinguished and effective 
vaccination available, the first inten­
sive care units had been established; 
respirators were already being trans­
ferred to other medical areas in which 
respiratory failure was a significant 
problem. The technology’s success in
response to the initial problem was 
the major rhetorical argument for 
transfer to other medical areas.
Arthur Caplan has reached similar 
conclusions in his studies of the de­
velopment of chronic dialysis treat­
m ent for patients with end-stage re­
nal disease.lJ Dialysis was introduced 
in medical practice in consecutive 
stages of invention, advertising, ac­
ceptance, and mastery, throughout 
which the criteria for applying and 
allocating the technology shifted and 
evolved. At first, medical indications 
for use of dialysis were very stringent. 
Later, when dialysis had achieved a 
less ambiguous status and was no 
longer regarded as an experimental 
procedure, categories of patients who 
were initially excluded began to be 
accepted into treatment programs. 
The most marked shift in application 
criteria took place between the pe­
riod of “acceptance” and “mastery.” 
Such findings imply that technology 
assessment has only limited value. 
Assessment studies in the early stages 
of technology development seem to 
be relevant primarily for facilitating 
acceptance of the technology. As 
soon as the technology has indeed 
been accepted, the criteria for appli­
cation will shift, and the pool of pa­
tients for whom the technology is “in­
dicated” will expand. This process 
problematizes the current notion of 
the life cycle of a technology. With­
ou t p roper “post-TA surveillance” 
there will be no guarantee that the 
scale of use of the technology will 
stabilize or decrease. Unlike biologi-
Unlike 
to ex
gical organisms, medical technologies tend
without inherent constraints.
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cal organisms, medical technologies 
tend  to expand without inherent con­
straints.
Technology assessment studies 
connect themselves with policy as well 
as medical practice, however, either 
as integrated components or as sup­
portive elements of the policymaking 
process. Such connection is based on 
certain presuppositions about both 
technology assessment and  decision­
making processes. In particular, tech­
nology assessment is presented as a 
scientific activity that produces em­
pirical and objective data;16 ideally, it 
is “a technology for the safe, effective, 
and economical use of technology, ”17 
Such metatechnology can be used as 
an “early warning system” to forecast 
the impact of technological change.
The process of decisionmaking is 
also conceptualized in a specific way. 
First, it is presupposed that policy de­
cisions are rational: the m ore and bet­
ter knowledge, the better decisions. 
The usual flow chart is as follows: a 
new technology is available; technol­
ogy assessment studies evaluate it; 
evaluation data present various policy 
options; one of these options is se­
lected.18 However, in daily practice, 
rational weighing and balancing of 
objective information seem to have 
hardly any influence on how tech­
nologies are actually used. For exam­
ple, in 1973 the Dutch insurance 
companies introduced a detailed list 
o f medical indications for childbirth 
in a hospital to counter declining 
rates of home births. Despite the 
clear demarcation of norm al and 
pathological birth, and despite reli­
able data indicating that delivery in a 
hospital is associated with unneces­
sary use of technology, the percent­
age of hospital deliveries increased 
from  15 to 44 percent between 1975 
and  1988.19 When medical technol­
ogy is available, it seems inevitably to 
be used, even in the face of objective 
data that it is inappropriate.
A second presupposition concerns 
the goal of policy decisions. Social 
control of technology through policy 
processes is primarily interpreted as a
matter of regulation and restriction. 
The negative aspect of control is em­
phasized: the objective of policy is to 
anticipate, moderate, or suppress the 
potential dangers of technological 
change. Much attention is therefore 
given to questions of authority and 
decisionmaking power. In this view of 
policy as “being in control” socially, 
more positive dimensions are rela­
tively neglected. On another interpre­
tation, control refers to guiding, man­
aging, or steering, and gives rise to a 
different set of questions, for exam­
ple, how the dynamics of technologi­
cal change can be guided in desired 
directions, or how technology can be 
steered toward a specific goal or set of 
goals. A problem, of course, is that 
technological development itself 
seems to make it impossible to take a 
positive approach. Obstetric technol­
ogy, for instance, obliterates the dif­
ference between nature (normal de­
livery) and culture (medically as­
sisted delivery). That would imply 
that medical and natural reality are 
indistinguishable, and that there is 
no longer any criterion to distinguish 
between physiology and pathology, 
unless such a distinction is made 
through outside, nonmedical inter­
vention. Yet such delineation will only 
be temporary, since technological 
change will tend to eliminate it.
Technology assessment, finally, 
presupposes that a clear demarcation 
can be made between the medical 
and the nonmedical. The definitions 
above take more or less for granted 
that there is a predetermined medi-
cal domain, delimited by a specific set 
of concepts, methods, and techniques 
that are applied in the diagnosis and 
treatment of disease and illness. New 
technologies are thought to originate 
outside this domain; after prototyp­
ing and adequate testing in basic re­
search laboratories, they are then in­
troduced into the medical dom ain 
for clinical application.
This presupposition is no t substan­
tiated when the actual development 
of new technologies is studied. In­
stead of being introduced into a p re­
determ ined dom ain, technologies 
themselves bring about new demarca­
tions between what is medical and 
what is nonmedical; they in fact reor­
der, change, recreate, and redefine 
the domain of medicine. This shap­
ing and reshaping o f  medical reality 
is perhaps most conspicuous in die 
area of reproductive technologies.20 
Childlessness has been  m ore an d  
more transform ed into a m edical 
problem through the availability of 
these technologies. The experience 
of infertility as suffering cannot be 
separated from  increasing control 
over the reproductive process. Prob­
lem and solution are not unrelated. 
Now that, for instance, it is possible to 
create postmenopausal pregnancies, 
it has become more difficult to accept 
the condition of postm enopausal 
childlessness. To a certain extent, this 
condition has been transformed into 
a state of suffering because infertility 
is seen merely as a biological defect 
that can be overcome by technical 
intervention. The expanding use o f 
hum an growth horm one gives an­
other example of shifting boundaries 
between the medical and the non­
medical domains."1 Initially devel­
oped to treat children with growth 
hormone deficiency, the wider avail­
ability of h o rm o n es p ro d u c ed  
through recom binant DNA technol­
ogy transforms the physical charac- 
teristic of short stature into a poten­
tial medical problem, bringing it into 
the medical domain as a possible ob­
ject of intervention.
Technology and Ethics
The presuppositions underly ing  
the current concept of technology 
assessment have the effect that tech­
nology has hardly any inherent rela-
When medical technology is available, it seems inevitably 
to be used, even in the face of objective data that it is 
inappropriate.
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tionship with moral issues. Technol­
ogy is no t considered an integral 
component of society; it is not studied 
as a social practice. When social and 
moral problems arise, they are under­
stood to be secondary to the intro­
duction of die technology, and re­
lated to the application phase of new 
knowledge, abilities, and instruments. 
For the analysis and resolution of 
these problems, a new type of tech­
nology—technology assessment—has 
been developed that generates objec­
tive information to facilitate rational 
decisionmaking. According to this 
conception, technology is not a prob­
lem, bu t rather itself a solution to 
problems. In a decontextualized view 
of technology like this, moral issues 
necessarily come to belong to the pe­
riphery of scientific interest. Thus 
the ambivalent relationship between 
technology assessment and ethics has 
to do in part with the narrowness of 
the current view of technology.
Yet this is only one part of die story. 
Ethics itself is n o t untouched by tech­
nological change. In a certain sense, 
ethics has become part and parcel of 
the technological order. It has been 
professionalized as an autonomous 
discipline external to medical prac­
tice, It is dominated by an engineer­
ing model of moral reasoning and 
impregnated with the idea of techni­
cal rationality, applying principles to 
practices.22
In theory, medical technologies of­
fer three separate possibilities for 
ethical research, depending on when 
in the process o f technology develop­
ment moral questions arise. Prelimi­
nary and preconditional moral questions 
concern moral issues that must be 
clarified before an innovation can be 
examined in clinical circumstances 
(for example, informed consent, bur­
dens and benefits). Usually, review 
boards address these questions when 
scrutinizing research protocols. Prac­
tical moral questions arise during the 
execution of an assessment study. 
They concern, for example, the inter­
actions between professional and pa­
tient/client, or the definitions, de­
scriptions, and data presented to in­
vite cooperation in research or ther­
apy. Moral issues that might arise 
during advertising, applying, and 
perfecting new technologies are 
rarely explored in assessment studies.
Finally, consequential moral questions 
concern the impact of the introduc­
tion and application of a technology. 
When ethical analysis is connected 
with technology assessment, it is usu­
ally focused on questions of this type. 
For example, when in vitro fertiliza­
tion is applied in medical practice 
and leads to the production of spare 
embryos, the moral question is what 
to do with these embryos. Similar 
questions concern the criteria for ap­
plication of the technology: should 
IW  be used for postm enopausal 
women? Such moral questions are 
generally accepted as legitimate com­
ponents of a technology assessment 
study. Analyzing these questions is 
useful since it may help to demarcate 
the applications of the technology 
that are acceptable within a particular 
society. However, given the other 
points at which moral questions may 
arise, in the practice of technology 
assessment the exploration of ethical 
issues remains quite restricted.
A proposal to promote the exami­
nation of moral issues in technology 
assessment has recently been publish­
ed by a committee of the National 
Hospital Council in the Netherlands, 
which made a plea for systematic 
“ethical assessment” of medical tech- 
nology. The committee also distin­
guishes three categories of ethical 
questions: preliminary questions, ap­
plication questions, and regulatory 
questions. This categorization, how­
ever, does not depart significantly 
from current practice. The first set of 
questions is ex ante, the other two are 
ex post. The design of technology as­
sessment studies can rem ain un­
changed: certain moral issues relat­
ing to foreseeable consequences have 
to be settled prior to the start o f study 
(using the help of IRBs); other issues 
will follow from the application and 
introduction of the technology in 
clinical practice, and they can be re­
solved by defining what is responsible 
application and how the technology 
should be applied. By adding a few 
questions to the standard protocol, 
the “ethical aspects” can therefore 
easily be accommodated in an evalu­
ation study.
The committee suggests what kind 
of questions are relevant. Nearly all of 
these questions regard the appropri­
ate use of a technology; the technol-
ogy as such is never considered to be 
a problem. The committee ultimately 
transforms ethics itself into a technol­
ogy. When ethical issues are just one 
aspect of the technology, they should 
indeed be examined in basically the 
same way as any o ther The questions 
intended to identify the ethical as­
pects can be arranged within a check­
list that may be used by everyone who 
wants to make “a generally accepted 
ethical judgm ent on the good usage 
of health care technology” (p, 14). In 
fact, the list presents a simple frame­
work, with the principles of respect 
for autonomy, beneficence, nonmale­
ficence, and justice on one side, and 
the three categories of relevant ques­
tions on the other. Ethics is nothing 
but a technology to make a particular 
set of (potential) problems manage­
able and controllable.
Repositioning Ethics in 
Technology Assessment
A ra th e r d ifferent approach 
emerges when a somewhat different 
distinction is drawn among ethical is­
sues in connection with medical tech-
C i A
nology. There is first the category of 
moral questions arising within the 
framework of the technology. Exam­
ples are debates about the moral 
status of the embryo or the condi­
tions for surrogate m otherhood. 
Questions of this type remain inside 
the framework of the technology; 
they proceed from an acceptance of 
the technology as a datum, trying to 
define its responsible and appropri­
ate use. The second category consists 
of moral questions concerning the 
technology itself. Under this category 
analysis focuses on the question of 
whether the technology as such is jus­
tified in light of moral values. Tech­
nologies are expressions of funda­
mental values, such as the search for 
knowledge or the relief of suffering; 
however, these values are no longer 
taken as implicitly given, but as the 
starting point for a debate on (other) 
motivating values in society.
Usually, only the first type of moral 
question is addressed in technology 
assessment studies—in those studies 
that include any ethical analysis at a ll 
This restriction shows not only that 
the focus of ethical analysis is too nar­
row, but also that it is not self-critical.
The fact that we are confronted with 
more and more moral problems is 
basically related to the penetration, 
domination, and “colonization” of 
our life and world by science and 
technology. The answer to such prob­
lems cannot be given (at least not 
solely) by an ethics that is itself tech­
nologically oriented. In fact, when 
moral problems are primarily ap­
proached  in an engineering way, 
technically applying principles to 
cases and dilemmas, ethics itself be­
comes another manifestation of die 
same basic problem.
The fundamental objection against 
focusing upon the first type of ethical 
questions, then, is that in doing so 
ethics is incorporated into a techno­
logical model to evaluate and calcu­
late effects, and to control and elimi­
nate problems. Within such a model, 
the criticism that this conception of 
“techno-ethics” is itself a component 
of the  fundamental problem that 
brings us to moral debate in the first 
place can have no force.
A new approach to technology as­
sessment should be more self-critical 
and should address the second type 
of moral questions mentioned above. 
Etliicists might contribute more help­
fully to evaluating medical technol­
ogy by recasting the way problems are 
defined, by exploring the interrela­
tionship of technical and nontechni­
cal issues, and by analyzing technol­
ogy itself ^ s problematic.
Technological developments trans­
late problems in both senses of the 
word: they recast the initial problem 
into a new phraseology that may cre­
ate new concepts; they also relocate 
problems and may shift responsibility 
for finding acceptable solutions. An 
example of this translation process is 
presented in a study of changing defi­
nitions of death under the influence * 2^) of intensive care technology. ° An­
other example is the emergence of 
the concept of “pre-embryo” follow­
ing the introduction of in vitro fertili­
zation. The moral debate can be bet­
ter understood when we examine how 
problems are transformed through 
technological innovations.
Analyzing the transformation of 
problem s under the influence of 
medical technology also initiates sys­
tematic reflection on the goals of 
m edicine and health care. Some­
times new technologies are adver­
tised as a solution for problems that 
did not previously exist; some are 
m arketed  without any identified 
need. Some technologies are looking 
for an application, creating their own 
market, inducing a particular need. 
Nobody will argue, for example, that 
a N intendo game computer is the 
long-awaited answer to a longstand­
ing problem, but with medical tech­
nology things appear to be different. 
Medical technology is always re­
garded as the result of planned activi­
ties directed toward solving a medical 
problem. But why? In what respect is 
a CT scanner or MRI different from a 
Nintendo? Medical technology seems 
to be related to a specific value con­
text. We distinguish a CT scan from 
Nintendo by referring to goals that 
are pursued. Within the context of 
medicine, technologies are always ap­
plied with the intention of accom­
plishing a particular good, which im­
plies that evaluation of new technolo­
gies should also explicate and analyze 
the good that is the leitmotif of tech­
nological innovation and change.
A second contribution of ethics is 
explicitly to study the interwovenness 
of technology and society. Technol­
ogy can only be applied when various 
nontechnical problems are also re­
solved; technical issues can be settled 
only when an adequate context has 
been created. A single technology in­
troduced retrospectively in a histori­
cal culture (such as a gasoline engine 
for a Roman trireme) has no purpose 
and function. In other words, tech­
nology exists within networks of social 
practices; without intrinsic connec­
tions between technical and non­
technical factors it will not function at 
all. To understand the moral dimen­
sions of new technologies, ethical 
study should therefore also analyze 
the context within which these tech­
nologies exist and function. Diagno­
ses and disease entities, pathophysi­
ological explanations and therapeu­
tic rationales may vary depending on 
cultural values and normative tradi­
tions; so too medical technologies are 
em bedded in networks of heteroge­
neous values.
Finally, changing technology itself 
can become the object of analysis as 
ethics focuses, not on the social ef­
fects of medical technology, but on
the technical rationality manifesting 
itself in and through technology. Eth­
ics might ask, for example, what we 
ought to do when this type of ration­
ality dominates our response to com­
plicated hum an situations and expe­
riences of suffering, bodiliness, finite­
ness, disability, and illness. There is 
no doubt that the fascination and 
power of technical rationality has 
brought us many positive things, but 
we also know well how it is associated 
with compartmentalization and di- 
minishment of experiences and in­
terpretations. For example, in the his­
tory of the evolution o f technology in 
medicine, the relevance and impor­
tance of the subjective experiences of 
the patient have been diminished, 
leading to a decline o f die clinical 
dialogue.26 Technology seems to go 
hand in glove with a tendency to 
value objects, things, instrum ents 
more than people. Another example 
is the emergence of specific conflicts 
of interest since the introduction of 
technology in clinical practice; the 
treating physician now is in many 
cases at the same time a  scientific re­
searcher and it can no longer be 
naturally assumed that the interests 
of the individual patient will prevail 
over other important interests.27 The 
availability of technology may also in­
duce in patients some alienation 
from their own subjective experi­
ences. The possibility o f kidney trans­
plantation in children and the better 
results with organs from living related 
donors place family relations in a dif­
ferent perspective. The availability of 
reproductive technologies is chang­
ing the meaning of female bodiliness; 
reproduction and fertility as body 
functions are reinterpreted against 
an implicit norm  of productivity. The 
tendency of technology to reorient 
and dominate our experiences and 
practices has, of course, been known 
for a long time and has been the topic 
of much philosophical thought. How­
ever, m odern health care ethics has 
only rarely taken this as an explicit 
theme of reflection. Instead of mod­
eling itself on technology and adopt­
ing technology’s m ethods, ethics 
should explore and articulate the 
fundam ental d isconten t evoked 
when medical technology becomes 
the basic source of moral issues, and 
should seek out new perspectives.28
Such an approach need not proceed 
from pessimism concerning die over­
whelming power of technical ration­
ality; it should start from the notion 
that u nderstand ing  the power of 
technology also yields insight into the 
limits of a technological world view. 
Not despite b u t because of technol­
ogy, man is able to obtain a better 
understanding of the condition hu- 
maine. The power and dominance of 
technology stimulates us particularly 
to search for o ther aspects of being 
human than m ere technical, instru­
mental action.29 The more the hu­
man body, hum an life, and suffering 
are molded and  controlled by medi­
cal technology, the more we can dis­
cover that the meaning of human ex­
istence is n o t reduced to increasing 
regulation and  control of life and 
world. In o ther words, precisely the 
dominance of technical rationality 
gives us cause for breaking out of the 
technological framework. If ethicists 
do not use this opportunity for philo­
sophical reflection, who will?
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